The Anatomy and Implications of Repealing the Reporting Requirement of the UN’s 1533 Sanctions Regime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Executive Summary

            Beginning in 2003, the UN established the 1533 Sanctions Regime for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to signal support for a negotiated settlement to the conflict, help facilitate Security Sector Reform (SSR) and improve Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM). Within the sanctions regime, a requirement for member states selling weapons to the government of the DRC to inform the UN Security Council[1], known as the “Reporting Requirement,” was a point of controversy for the DRC and its allies, who claimed, counter to physical evidence collected over years by the UN Group of Experts (GOE), that the Reporting Requirement was de facto arms embargo against the government of the DRC. In light of the M23 insurgency in the east of the country and escalating tensions with Rwanda, the DRC, with the help of Russia, China, and France, was able to remove the reporting requirement from the 1533 regime, signaling, for the first time since 1960, the Council’s inadvertent support, or at least ambivalence, for a non-negotiated military solution to the ongoing violence in the eastern DRC.

Background: 1533’s Original Intention

            On a macro-level, the 1533 regime was meant to signal support for a negotiated peace agreement to the violence in the DRC, and the reporting requirement was intended to facilitate the surveillance of weapons flows to NSAGs with the hope of facilitating SSR and WAM improvements. Since implementation, the likelihood that the reporting requirements has fulfilled its purpose is low.

UN Sanctions to Signal Peace Agreement Support

In the early 2000s, the Council routinely deployed sanctions regimes to signal support for peace agreements and attempt to influence adherence to those agreements[2]. In the case of the DRC, the 1533 regime specifically signaled support for the Lusaka peace agreement (1999) and to help coerce adherence to the agreement amidst breaches by the fractured government and numerous rebel groups[3]. Coinciding with the sanctions regime, the Council also mandated a peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, furthering signaling the Council’s overarching supporting for a peaceful, negotiated solution, in lieu of violence, to the conflict in the eastern DRC.

           

Reporting Requirements to Influence SSR and WAM

Beyond the macro-level signaling intention of the sanctions regime, the Reporting Requirement was meant to address SSR and WAM[4] in support of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programming. Many of the non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operating in the eastern DRC were and continue to be populated by former Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo (FARDC) officers and soldiers whose history and relationships with the military and their influence in the east allows them to siphon weapons from national stockpiles[5]. This conflict dynamic prompted the Council to institute the Reporting Requirement, stressing “the importance of urgently carrying out DDR and SSR.” In real terms, the reporting requirement obliged member states to report to the Council any weapons sales, military assistance, or military training to the DRC[6] — the intention of which was not to prevent the flow of weapons and military assistance to the government but to allow the international community to track weapons that might end up in the hands of NSAGs.

Reporting Requirement Lacking Efficacy

The efficacy of the reporting requirement, the ability to track weapons flows to NSAGs and prompt an improvement of SSR/G and WAM, is unclear and likely non-complimentary at best. A GOE study covering 2010 to 2020 showed that “the diversion [of weapons and ammunition] from national stockpiles remained the main source of supply for armed groups in the DRC” and that, “the bulk of weapons documented with armed groups were obtained from the FARDC either during operations or transferred directly by members of the FARDC/PNC to armed groups”[7]. More recently, a member of the M23 confirmed that a main source for their weapons supply is pilfering government weapons depots[8]. Nonetheless, the GOE recently reiterated their belief in the ability of reporting requirements to prevent the diversion of national stockpiles to armed groups[9], implying that though the situation is suboptimal a framework without the reporting requirement would be worse. Despite the Council’s intention and the GOE’s recent statement of support, it does not appear that the reporting requirement has had any tangible impact on preventing weapon’s flows from government stockpiles to NSAGs.

 

 

Democratic Republic of Congo’s Opposition to 1533 Reporting Requirement

DRC Policy Argument: De Facto Arms Embargo

The government of the DRC routinely opposed the 1533 reporting requirement, arguing that it acted as a de facto arms embargo that inhibited its ability to acquire the caliber of weapons systems and military assistance necessary to end violence in the eastern part of the country, specifically and most recently to counter a M23 insurgency north of Goma along the border with Rwanda and Uganda. Immediately prior to the repeal of the reporting requirement, the DRC’s foreign minister spoke before the Council and made their argument explicit, stating that peace in the eastern part of the country rested upon the government’s ability to supply, “its defense and security forces with efficient equipment to carry out their sovereign tasks.” [10] The DRC’s position, seeking a military solution in the east, ran in opposition to the original intent of 1533 to bring about a negotiated solution, and prior to the sudden repeal in late 2022 their argument gained little traction within the Council.

Policy Reality: DRC Cover Up and Financial Institution Overcompliance

In addition to opposing policy positions, support for the DRC’s argument was lacking because of the inaccuracy of their claims. The GOE identified that the government of DRC routinely received weapons, military assistance, and training since the reporting requirement’s introduction, often occurring without any notification to the Council[11]. The DRC government also orchestrated a cover-up scheme to hide the purchase of some weapons, labelling them as “agricultural imports”[12]. DRC officials argued the practice was necessary to access financing for the weapons transaction, and the GOE confirmed that DRC based, and foreign financial intuitions have a habit of over-compliance — avoiding the weapon’s trade entirely, even if permitted under the reporting requirement[13]. Due to the difficulty of tracking weapons within the DRC and the trend of national stockpiles to be pilfered by NSAGs[14], financial institutions are justified in their aversion to interacting with the DRC on such transactions. Recent legal action in the US is seeking to hold medical suppliers to the Iraqi government responsible for the proceeds of pilfered supplies that were ultimately used to fund Shia militia terror activities against US forces[15]; if a similar approach was applied to weapons transactions in the DRC, parties to the transaction could be held responsible for supporting listed entitled on the 1533 sanctions list. Ultimately, it is the poor security sector governance and weapons management that undermines the DRC’s ability to licitly finance weapons transactions, not the 1533 reporting requirement.

1533 Reporting Requirement Repeal

            Culminating in an off-cycle vote in December 2022, the DRC was able to garner support in the Council to repeal the 1533 reporting requirement. The impetus for the repeal culminated from two battlefield developments, the resurgence of the M23 north of Goma and the overt operations of Rwanda in the eastern Congo (often in support of the M23), and the subsequent international diplomatic implications of those battlefield changes, namely France’s desire to improve relations with the DRC without making strong, public condemnations of Rwanda’s actions and Russia and China’s desire to oppose the US position, in general and especially on sanctions issues, in the Council.

M23 Resurgence and Rwandan Involvement

            Beginning in 2021, reaching an apex in the autumn of 2022 and continuing through the spring of 2023, the M23 rebel group launch a renewed insurgency in the eastern DRC, north of Goma along the border with Rwanda. Throughout its history, the M23 has regularly operated on the Rwandan border, potentially within Rwanda, and has been involved in securing an illegal gold trade from the DRC through Rwanda[16]. Therefore, when the M23 resurfaced in 2021 as a highly organized and efficient fighting force after years of silent hibernation, suspicions arouse that the group was receiving direct support from the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF). Amidst the height of the violence in 2022, a confidential GEO report was released which provided evidence that Rwanda was not only directly supporting the M23 but also that the RDF was conducting some operations inside of the DRC alongside the M23[17]. Alongside these battlefield developments the DRC continued to argue that the reporting requirement inhibited its ability to defend its sovereignty against the M23[18], and it was able to gain a loosening of the 1533 reporting requirements after the release of the GOE report.

Council Dynamics: DRC Support From Russia and China

            As the DRC was not on the Security Council at the time, it relied upon it allies in the A3 and other partners, namely China and Russia, to secure the changes in July and the ultimate elimination of the reporting requirement in December 2022. In addition to conversations held with diplomats present during the period of negotiations[19], public statements from China and Russia also affirmed their support for the changes to 1533 in line with the DRC longstanding position. Russia explicitly referred to the reporting requirement as a “sanctions regime imposed on the government of the [DRC]” that prevents the security sector from achieving its objectives”[20]. Similarly, the Chinese representative stated that the reporting requirements, “[constrain] the DRC security capacity and the efforts to find a fundamental solution to the situation in the eastern DRC”[21]. China also broke silence, with the A3, on the renewal 1533 process[22] – a surprise[23] that forced the first vote and debate on the validity of the reporting requirement in 2022. Both Russia’s and China’s support to the DRC in 2022 stem from a history of opposition to UN sanctions regimes in general. The United States’ public support for 1533 and its reporting requirement likely motivated Russian public opposition to the reporting requirement as a way gain a small diplomatic win against the US amidst the invasion in Ukraine. Conversely, China had motivations specific to the DRC — where China maintains large mining operations for which China often engages the FARDC as private security[24]. As such, China has an interest not only in maintain the military-political stability of its assets in the Southeast of the country, but also an interest in expanding those interests north of Goma. By providing public support at the Security Council for a longstanding DRC grievance on 1533, China was able to better its relationship with the DRC to secure their existing interests. China followed up on their diplomatic efforts through a hard power move, delivering 9 CH-4 Rainbow drones to the FARDC (the most modern weapons systems acquisitions for FARDC in years; see annex 2)  in  in the month following the 1533 changes[25] — again improving its relationship with the DRC government and providing the means for which to provide the FARDC a path to military dominance north of Goma where more mining opportunities could exist.

France: 1533 to Stabilize African Relationships

            While support against the reporting requirement gained momentum in the Council, the total repeal was largely dependent upon France, the penholder for the 1533 regime and MONUSCO. France ultimately acquiesced and supported the removal of the reporting requirement as means to show support for the DRC vis-à-vis its fight against RDF backed M23 and as means to condemn Rwanda’s actions without making an explicit public statement. In a broader African context over the same period of the M23 resurgence, France was struggling to maintain a positive diplomatic footing on the continent, with especially souring relations in the Sahel[26]. During these same years, France explicitly worked to maintain good relations with Rwanda. Paris specifically sought stronger relations with President Kagame — a move typical of the French approach of actor specific diplomacy in Africa. The overarching strategic decision to focus on fostering relations with Rwanda was deemed necessary by President Macron in light of the commission he launched exposing France’s embarrassing role in the Rwandan Genocide and as a counter to President Mitterrand’s public and convivial relationship to Kagame’s former Hutu rival, Juvenal Habyarimana[27]. Under these conditions, worsening relations across the continent and a fragile relationship with Rwanda, France found it difficult to publicly condemn Rwanda’s support for the M23, even though it did publicly condemn the violence in the eastern Congo[28]. Partially succumbing to pressure within the Council, France saw the end of the reporting requirement as a “gesture”[29] to silently endorse the DRC’s argument for the right to defend its sovereignty (i.e.: a recognition of the RDFs action in the east) and a silent condemnation of Kagame’s renewed support for the M23. While the success of France’s attempt to please all parties with the changes to 1533 can be analyzed elsewhere, the French position is what ultimately pushed the repeal of the reporting requirement across the finish line.

Implications for UN Sanctions Policy

            Though a thorough analysis, as outlined above, demonstrates that the repeal of the 1533 reporting requirement came about due to a confluence of factors in the eastern DRC and among the P5’s own geopolitical concerns, the reporting requirement was repealed under the DRC’s narrative that the policy was a de facto arms embargo that was preventing the government’s ability to establish a lasting peace in the east of the country. While the physical reality is unlikely to change (as noted above, weapons and military assistance continued to flow into the DRC unreported over the past 18 years), the repeal has two implications for the signaling power of the UN Sanctions regimes. First and most clearly, the DRC’s long campaign against the reporting requirement helps to confirm previous research arguing that sanctions regimes, whether concretely impactful or not, do have power as a means to signal disapproval[30]. In the case of the DRC, the reporting requirement signaled a lack of faith in the DRC security sector governance (SSG) and WAM; by extension this prevented a discussion on the possibility of a viable military solution led by the DRC to the conflict in the east. The DRC understood this signal and knew that in order to proceed with a military solution with support from the DRC it would need to reverse or diminish the disapproval of its SSG by eliminating the reporting requirement. Second, the reporting requirement’s repeal under the DRC’s narrative sends a new signal from the Council, that a military, instead of a negotiated peace, solution in the eastern DRC would be acceptable. Whether such a signal is truly intentional on behalf of the Council is unclear, however the narrative is aligned with the trend in declining support for UN peacekeeping missions, especially MONUSCO. In a broader case, Somalia’s new militarized policy to weed out insurgents was met with silence by the international community, a reaction interpreted as tacit support[31]. On the ground, it appears the DRC has interpreted the repeal as support for their military strategy; in addition to their Chinese drone purchases earlier this year, the DRC also hired two high profile mercenaries (one of them a French national) for air force and infantry operations[32]. While a unified statement would be unlikely due to the current animosity on the Council between Russia, China, and the US, Council members should 1.) recognize that their sanctions actions have real signaling power 2.) acknowledge that they have publicly implied they no longer have faith in a peaceful resolution over a military solution to the conflict in the eastern DRC 3.) clarify amongst themselves, and especially with the secretariat charged with administering MONUSCO, whether the DRC’s military solution is one they truly with to support.


 

Sources and References:

 

Broadhurst, Nathalie (Deputy PR France to the UN) (20 DEC 2022) via UN Web TV https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1w/k1w38lfelv

 

Boon, Kristen “The Legal Framework for Security Council Sanctions” in Terminating Security Council Sanctions (2014) (International Peace Institute)

 

Le Cam, Morgane « RDC un rapport confidentiel de l’ONU apport des « preuves solides » de l’implication du Rwanda dans l’Est » Le Monde (4 AUG 2022) https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/08/04/un-rapport-confidentiel-de-l-onu-accuse-des-militaires-rwandais-d-attaques-contre-l-armee-congolaise-et-de-soutien-au-m23_6137182_3212.html

 

Carayannis, Tatiana “The Democratic Republic of the Congo” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century edited Davide Malone et al. (2015)

 

Charron, Andrea “UN Sanctions and Conflict: Responding to Peace and Security Threats” (Routledge, 2011)

 

Cohen, Corentin “Will France’s Africa Policy Hold Up?” from The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2 JAN 2022) https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/06/02/will-france-s-africa-policy-hold-up-pub-87228

 

Eckert, Sue “The Role of Sanctions” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century edited Davide Malone et al. (2015)

 

France 24 « UN Alarmed over surge in violence in eastern DR Congo” (28 MAR 2023) https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230327-un-alarmed-over-surge-in-violence-in-eastern-dr-congo

 

Ghâtelot, Christophe “En Afrique, le nouveau « partenariat » proposé par Emmanuel Macron mis à l’épreuve par la crise en RDC » (6 Mars 2022) Le Monde https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/03/06/en-afrique-le-nouveau-partenariat-propose-par-emmanuel-macron-mis-a-l-epreuve-par-la-crise-en-rdc_6164267_3212.html

 

Gobbers, Erik and Ken Matthysen “Armed Conflict, Insecurity, and Mining in Eastern DRC: Reflections on the nexus between natural resources and armed conflict” from International Peace Information Service and USAID (7 DEC 22) https://ipisresearch.be/publication/armed-conflict-insecurity-and-mining-in-eastern-drc-reflections-on-the-nexus-between-natural-resources-and-armed-conflict/

 

Gomez-Suarez, Andrei and Newman, Johnathan “Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: have Santos and FARC learnt the lessons from the past?” in Third World Quarterly (2013) pp. 819-837 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2013.800747

 

Gouby, Mélinie “The Rebirth of Congo’s Rebellion” in Foreign Policy (4 JULY 2022)

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/04/m23-rebel-group-congo-rwanda-uganda/

 

Harris, Gardiner “Lawsuit Claims Three U.S. Companies Funded Terror in Iraq” (2017) The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/johnson-ge-pfizer-terror-iraq.html

 

Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. & Elliott, K. (2007) “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered”

 

Kellogg Hansen Todd Figel and Frederick PPLC “Families of Americans Killed or Injured…” (4 JAN 2022) https://www.kellogghansen.com/f-40.html

 

Lektzian, David J. and Sprecher, Chistopher M. “Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict” in American Journal of Political Science (APR 2007) pp. 415-431 https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4620074.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa7d247361ddad72761ae73b47d6fa05e&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1

 

Liffran, Olivier and Tilouine, Joan “Foreign Private Military Contractors Flood Into North Kivu” (6 JAN 2023) Africa Intelligence https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2023/01/06/foreign-private-military-contractors-flood-into-north-kivu,109879278-eve

 

M23 “Update 17 February 2023” (Twitter) https://twitter.com/M23_ARC/status/1626636493119684613?cxt=HHwWioCw8bXR_JItAAAA See also, tweets from 5 through 22 FEB 2023 (See Annex 1 for example).

 

MFA, China “Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Zhang Jun on UN Security Council Resolution on Renewing the Sanctions on the Democratic Republic of Congo” (30 JUN 2022) https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202206/t20220630_10713201.html

 

Onishi, Norimitsu “France Has Overwhelming Responsibility for Rwanda Genocide, Report Says” The New York Times (26 MAR 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/world/europe/france-rwanda-genocide.html

 

Richmond, Oliver P. “The Problem of Peace: Understanding the ‘Liberal Peace’” in Conflict, Security, and Development (2006) Vol. 6 No. 3 pp. 291-314 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678800600933480?journalCode=ccsd20

 

de Rohan Chabot, Pierre-Ellie, Olivier Liffran, Joan Tilouine « Face au M23, Kinshasa se dote de drones armés chinois » (21 FEB 2023) Africa Intelligence https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-centrale/2023/02/21/face-au-m23-kinshasa-se-dote-de-drones-armes-chinois,109915018-eve

 

Sabbe, Brian “Why M23 is not your average rebel group” from International Peace Information Service (06 FEB 23) https://ipisresearch.be/weekly-briefing/why-m23-is-not-your-average-rebel-group/?highlight=DRC&hilite=DRC

 

Schipani, Andres “Somalia Rebuilds: the glass is now half-full” in Financial Times (16 APR 2023) https://www.ft.com/content/0b968db2-2b34-482b-8ab0-946c2d2cceb4

 

Security Council Report “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Vote on Resolution Renewing the Sanctions Regime” (29 JUNE 22) https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/06/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-resolution-renewing-the-sanctions-regime.php (Accessed 17 FEB 23)

 

Scarcella, Mike “US Court Review Lawsuit Against Pfizer, other on Iraq Terrorism Funding Claims” (4 JAN 2022) Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/us-court-revives-lawsuit-against-pfizer-others-iraq-terrorism-funding-claims-2022-01-04/

 

de Tessières, Savannah “Effective Weapons Management and Ammunition Management in Changing DDR Context” from UN Dept. of Peace Operations Office for Disarmament Affairs (2021) https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/ddr-handbook-2ed-3_2021.pdf

 

Thompson, Jared “Examining Extremism: Allied Democratic Forces (AFD)” from CISIS (2021) https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-allied-democratic-forces

 

UN DDR Centre “WAM” (2020)  https://www.unddr.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/IDDRS-4.11-Transitional-Weapons-and-Ammunition-Management.pdf

 

van de Walle, Nelleke “East Africa’s DR Congo Force: The Case for Caution” (25 AUG 2022) International Crisis Group

https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/east-africas-dr-congo-force-case-caution

 

Wrong, Michela “Kagame’s Revenge” in Foreign Affairs (May/June 2023) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/africa/rwanda-congo-uganda-kagames-revenge

 

Weschler, Joanna “The evolution of security council innovations in sanctions” International Journal (Winter 2009-10) pp. 31-42

 

 

UN Resources

 

1533 Committee:  

 

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533#work%20and%20mandate

 

GOE Reports

 

S/2020/482 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/114/17/PDF/N2011417.pdf?OpenElement

S/2021/1104 https://daccess-ods.un.org/tmp/8716466.42684937.html

 

S/2021/560 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/113/46/PDF/N2111346.pdf?OpenElement

 

S/2022/479  https://daccess-ods.un.org/tmp/7051263.45157623.html

 

S/2022/967  https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/757/86/PDF/N2275786.pdf?OpenElement

 

Security Council Resolution and Reports:

 

S/Res/1493/2003 https://daccess-ods.un.org/tmp/8694720.86429596.html

 

S/Res/1533 (2004) https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/268/75/PDF/N0426875.pdf?OpenElement

 

S/Res/1807(2008) Establishing the Notification Requirement https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/288/63/PDF/N0828863.pdf?OpenElement

 

S/Res/2667(2022) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/sres26672022

 

Interviews 1 and 2

 

Two conversations were held with representatives from P5 countries with knowledge of the process of reporting requirement’s repeal at the Council, the Council dynamics leading up to the vote, and the geopolitical situation surrounding the conflict in the DRC. Both sets of conversations were anonymized. In the text, information from the conversations is referenced as “Interview 1” or  “Interview 2.”


[1] Hereafter, “the Council.”

[2] Charron, 2011: 93; Weschler, 2009; Eckert, 2015; Boon, 2004

[3] Carayannis, 2015: 667-672; NB: for a basic overview of the 1533 regime as it stands today, please see Annex 3

[4] For more on both subjects in relation to DDR and post-conflict settings see: Tessières, 2021 and UNDDR Centre, 2020.

[5] Sabbe, 2023 and Thompson, 2021

[6] S/Res/1807/2008

[7] S/2020/482: p. 31 and Annex 73

[8] van de Walle, 2022

[9] S/2022/479 par. 18

[10] S/PV.9215/2022

[11] S/2020/482

[12] S/2022/479 p. 6

[13] ibid

[14] Sabbe, 2023 and Thompson, 2021; S/2020/482: p. 31 and Annex 73; van de Walle, 2022.

[15] Scarcella, 2022; Kellogg et al., 2022; Harris, 2017.

 

[16] Gouby, 2022; Sabbe, 2023;

[17] Le Cam, 2022; S/2022/967

[18] Interview 1, 2023

[19] Ibid

[20] S/PV.9215/2022; S/PV.9215/2022

[21] MFA China, 2022

[22] Security Council Report, 2022;

[23] Interview 1, 2023

[24] Interview 1 and 2; Gobbers and Matthysen, 2022; S/2021/560 par. 126).

[25] de Rohan Chabot, 2023

[26] Corentin, 2022

[27] Ibid; Wrong; 2023; Onishi, 2021

[28] Ghâtelot, 2023

[29] Interview 2, 2023

[30] Lektzian, 2009; Hufbauer et. al., 2007: p. 7

[31] Schipani, 2023

[32] Liffran, 2023

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