Article Review: Dessler “What is At Stake in the Agency Structure Debate”
Dessler, David “What is At Stake in the Agency Structure Debate” in International Organization (1989) Vol. 43 No. 3 pp. 441 – 473
In “What is At Stake in the Agency Structure Debate?” David Dessler presents an “internal” critique of Waltz’s structural realism — accepting international relations as structural in nature but expanding ontology to include constitutive rules — and thus some state agency (ibid; pp. 441-2). Ultimately, Dessler hopes to formulate theories that are partially structural and partially agential. He argues mixing structure and agency at the ontological level will allow more phenomena to be reduced by theory, and it will prevent structural determinism present in Waltz’s current outlook (ibid; pp. 444-6, 472-3). Building from Dessler’s own example of classical physics to explain the importance of ontology, this paper will utilize an example of quantum physics to demonstrate how Dessler’s ontology must be expanded further. This expansion aims to eliminate the dualism used by Waltz and Dessler through incorporating the theorist into any ontology of international relations.
Dessler critiques Waltz by noting the assumption of “rationality” among states actually implies the existence of “social rules” as a part of the structure of international relations. This revelation demands a new model for understanding international relations. Dessler’s “transformation model” incorporates social rules into the ontological structure and reinterprets international relations structure as a dynamic medium for the action of states. In contrast, Waltz’s argues that the structure of the system — defined by anarchy and the distribution of power — of international relations dictates state action (ibid; pp. 450-1). This leaves the action and interaction of states at a “unit level,” and, as structure dictates action, there is no need to investigate how states act at the unit level. Dessler correctly identifies that Waltz, in a realist tradition, is able to dismiss analyzing how states interact because these actors (states) are assumed to be rational (ibid; 459). As such, structure becomes the focus of international relations because actors will choose the one rational option — not so much an agential decision but more an assessment of structural positionality. However, this implies an agreement on the definition of ‘rationality.’ Dessler identifies that assumed rationality is truly an agreement on constitutive social rules — those rules which define and create behavior (ibid; p. 456). Social rules enable actors to give meaning to their action, and, cyclically, rules also allow actors to act in the first place (ibid; pp. 457-8). Regarding a structural understanding of international relations, Dessler’s revelations indicate that actors do possess some agency in their ability to effect change on the system through how they interact. Thus, it becomes necessary to include social rules within the ontologically for understanding international relations because structure is now constitutive not only of the location of states within the structure but also of how those states interact with one another. Structure is now understood as a “medium” of activity for which states possess some agency.
Dessler’s goal to expand Waltz’s structural conception of international relations through an alteration of the ontology succeeds. Adopting the transformational model, which understands a structure as a medium through which action is affected and effects the system, an analysis of international affairs is now able to include an implied set of social rules that were previously unexplored in Waltz’s model. Dessler’s ontology is able to reduce an expanded set of phenomena from international relations. The ability to concentrate and understand the largest number of phenomena is a standard he borrows from Lakatos and which Dessler’s accepts as an indication of a successful theory (ibid; p. 447). Thus, by his own standard’s, Dessler’s work is successful. Though, through continued application of Lakatos’ standard, it becomes evident there are more phenomena of international relations that can be reduced through further revision on a structural ontology of international relations.
Waltz and Dessler approach their structural analysis within a neo-realist tradition of International Relations. This neo-realism accepts a principle of dualism. The concept of dualism in IR separates the scholar from the ‘stuff’ of international relations. That is to say, two world exists — one where the scholar theorizes and observers, and one where the international relations occur. The dualist approach in unable to account for the fact that theory is truly a tool of the scholar which effects International Relations the academic field and international relations the world events. As Cox famously says, “theory is always for someone and some purpose” (1981 and 1996). As such, the field of International Relations and its scholars cannot be separated from international relations, the events. The implication of such a view being that any ontology an International Relations scholar adopts must include the theorist himself. In the parlance of Waltz and Dessler’s structural analysis, the scholar becomes as much part of the structure of international relations as the elements of anarchy, states, and social rules[1]. To better express the necessity of eliminating dualism in International Relations theory, this paper will build off of Dessler’s example of classical physics to demonstrate the importance of ontology.
Dessler likens International Relations ontology to that of classical physics — an ontology consisting of a structured set of real things and theory being an “embodiment of our relations” between the things in the ontological structure (p. 445). Despite noting that theory has something to do with ourselves, the implication of the theorist on the ‘stuff’ international relations is not addressed. Quite fittingly, as Dessler chose classical physics to illuminate his neo-realist, dualist ontology, recent critical theorists develop an argument for the importance of accounting for the theorist in an International Relations ontology using quantum physics. Quantum physics identifies that particles can produce waves and patterns themselves (van der Tuin, 2016). Alternatively, classical physics (utilized by Dessler) understands particles as separate entities from waves and patterns resulting from disruptions (ibid). In the classical example (Dessler), a particle is not necessarily affecting anything on surrounding particles – it may just exist; in the quantum example (van der Tuin), a particle is inherently affecting and connected to other particles and waves because it emits waves through its own existence. Applied to constructing an otology to understand international relations, this means all particles must be accounted for. This includes the scholar constructing theory because their existence inherently sends out waves — or, is affecting the system — and scholars experience waves from other particles — or are affected by the system. The theorist and the world being theorized are inseparable. Returning to Dessler’s underlying desire to create an ontology that can reduce the greatest number of phenomena, this quantum approach to ontology indicates that any International Relations ontology must also include the theorist and the effects emanated from him into the system and those from the system effecting the theorist. Simply, Dessler’s expanded ontology is useful, however is still limited in its utilization of dualism, which excludes the forces on international relations related to the theorist.
To close, the importance and practical implications of eliminating dualist ontology is illuminated with Sabaratnam’s (2011) work on decolonizing International Relations. Sabaratnam recognizes that International Relations is decidedly Western and European centric. As an academic field it is thus limited to a Western, European understanding of international relations; it requires decolonizing efforts to incorporate additional, global interpretations of world affairs. This is predicated on the understanding that, “theories are not the ‘last word’ on phenomena, but analytic lenses that structure our thinking to a particular end” (ibid, pg. 3). Returning to Dessler, his expanded ontology under the transformational model cannot be thought of as presenting any objective truth. Rather, it achieves its own goal of accepting social rules for a structural interpretation of international relations. Dessler has a personal purpose for how he decides to expand ontology. Thus, as much as Dessler achieves eliminating structural determinism of Waltz’s theory, not recognizing Dessler’s own agency as an actor in international relations ignores the deterministic aspect of accepting any theory as objective, dualist and separate from the world the theorist theorizes.
Bibliography
Cox, Robert “Social Forces, States, and World Oders: Beyond International Relations Theory” in Journal of International Studies Vol. 10 No. 2 (1981) pp. 126-55
Sabaratnam, Meera “IR in Dialogue … But Can We Change the Subjects? A Typology of Decolonizing Strategies for the Study of World Politics” in Millennium Journal of International Relations (2011) Vol. 39 No. 3 pp. 781-803
van der Tuin, Iris “Reading Diffractive Reading: Where and When Does Diffraction Happen?” in Journal of Electronic Publishing Vol. 19 Iss. 2 (2016) https://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jep/3336451.0019.205?view=text;rgn=main
[1] Cox and other critical theorists would question the focus on structure, states, and the concept of anarchy. For simplicity that discussion will be left for elsewhere.