Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Analysis

This report was produced in 2020, at the start of renewed violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The military and political situation has shifted greatly since that period. At the current time (August 2023), Azerbaijan is blockading an Armenian envoy of humanitarian aid to Nagorno-Karabakh; Azerbaijan has kept the Nagorno-Karabakh increasingly isolated over past 8 months; and, the Armenian Prime Minister recently announced a major policy reversal, articulating his willingness to, in the near future, rencognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity over the region.

In late 2020, I assessed that the Russian-led peacekeeping force would be inadequate to address the foundational issues driving the conflict — namely longstanding political, social, and economic isolation between the two nations. In 2020, recent military alliances and trade agreements made between Armenia and the EU and Armenia and Russia heightened Azerbaijan’s sense that the status quo was being entrenched, and not in their favour.

As the Russian peacekeeping force merely froze the 2020 line of contact, Russia’s shift in focus (from exerting power throughout its “near east” region to fighting the war in Ukraine) has allowed Azerbaijan to continue pursing its goal, by force, of outright control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

While the dynamics have shifted over the past three years, the core elements of what should constitute a peace agreement remains similar. Firstly, any solution reached should be presented as final. The Minsk process and the Russian peacekeeping mission were undermined by their inability to reach a final agreement. Keeping the issue unresolved today risks cycling through another bout of violence in the coming years. Second, economic and social integration of Armenia and Azerbaijan should be a core theme of the agreement. Creating lines of social and economic contact and dependence between the two groups will help to reduce the ease by which each side is able to villainize the other as an outright enemy. As in 2020, an agreement similar to the Good Friday Accords that permits residents of Nagorno-Karabakh (and potentially Armenia and Azerbaijan more broadly) freedom of movement across both border and the right to either or both citizenships would help establish practical connections between the two communities; the large IDP communities in both countries, especially ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan, should also be granted at least full residency rights. Similarly, a free trade agreement between the two states could increase social ties and economic interdependence that would prevent another destablizing bout of violence. Third, a full scale DDR program for the Nagorno Karabakh Defense Forces should be undertaken alongside the demilitarisation of the public, which during the last conflict was documented to be well armed. This last step will help decrease the perceived threat and need for military action from the Azeri side.

As in 2020, the Minsk Group process or a UN-led effort are the least viable options for bringing about an agreement; the NATO option presented in 2020 is also no longer viable, due to Russia’s military presence in the Lachin Corridor and the geopolitical tension surrounding Ukraine. Due to that same geopolitical context, the window for a US-led peace mediation process is likely also off the table.

The most viable option remains a new regional coalition to mediate between the two parties. As suggested in 2020 and ever more probable following the brokering of the Black Sea grain deals, Ankara may be the best interlocutor to mediate peace. If a leading role from Turkey remains unpalatable for the Armenian side, Turkey must still be considered in peace negotiations, as it was their military support to Azerbaijan that allowed for rapid battlefield success in 2020 and which could again encourage Azerbaijan to take more aggressive action.

Executive Summary

            The conflict in Nagorno Karabakh is the result of ethnic isolation in the Southern Caucuses and the recent diplomatic and economic isolation of Azerbaijan. As with the Russian led agreement from in 1994, the current Russian led ceasefire does not address the underlying cause of the conflict. After the international community’s decade of mixed action and mixed results in in Nagorno Karabakh and peacebuilding globally, the United States’ involvement in Nagorno Karabakh could help build a solution for lasting peace by addressing foundational issues in the region and set a new tone for the next decade of international peacebuilding. This is also an opportunity for the Biden Administration to accomplish its goals of ending “forever wars” and to “restore and reimagine partnerships” as expressed during the 2020 campaign. To be successful, the United States must negotiate a peace agreement built on the themes of social, political, and economic integration. The most likely and practical option for US engagement is through a new coalition, with itself as the non-military, peace negotiator. An unlikely, but highly rewarding NATO-based option is also presented.

Background

Soviet-Led Ethnic Isolation

In the Southern Caucuses, a long-running trend of ethnic polarization largely contributed to the violence today. After World War I, the Soviet Union implemented Korenizatsiya — a policy that divided political and territorial control based on ethnic grounds[1] and ended an era where Armenians and Azerbaijani were living in heavily mixed communities.  Under Korenizatsiya Soviet Union established the Nagorno Karabakh autonomous Oblast (NKAO) in 1921 and afforded the majority Armenian area within the Republic of Azerbaijan more autonomy[2]. Due to the Korenizatsiya’s focus on ethnicity as a base for territorial power, the policy caused migration toward those ethnic poles of power — Armenians to Yerevan and Azerbaijanis to Baku[3]. This left the Armenian population of NKAO, encompassed by Azerbaijani territory, ethnically and politically isolated.

The Soviet Union’s collapse prompted the government of NKAO to reattach their power center to Yerevan with a vote to join Armenia[4]. With the tacit support of Armenia, the NKAO declared independence and went to war against Azerbaijan[5]. This 1991-4 war caused over 30,000 deaths and created hundreds of thousands of IDPs,[6] further entrenching the sentiments of ethnic and political isolation felt by former and new residents of the Nagorno Karabakh region. In 1994 Russia brokered a ceasefire, but the agreement did not address the fundamental issue of ethnic isolation and delayed talks on the final political status of Nagorno Karabakh[7].

Loss of Minsk Group Efficacy

In the same year, the OSCE’s Minsk Group chaired by the United States, Russia, and France, set out, but failed, to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement[8]. An ensueing 20 years of delays in discussing a final political agreement undermined faith in the Group’s ability to establish a peace agreement, and the Group instead became only a channel of communication for the belligerent parties[9]. The Group’s work was further undermined by accusations of bias from Azerbaijanis, who pointed to Russian-Armenian military cooperation (including a Russian military base in Armenia) and France and Azerbaijan’s longstanding diplomatic tensions as reasons why the two major players of the Minsk Group could not be trusted as impartial arbiters of peace. Having lost efficacy among the parties and the international community, the Minsk Group was not able to broker a ceasefire when large-scale violence erupted this year[10].

Economic Isolation

In addition to losing faith in the Minsk Group process, Azerbaijan also felt economically marginalized by the Europeans and the Russians. In 2015, new agreements between Georgia and the EU and Armenia and the EEA isolated Azerbaijan from the largest trade blocs in the area.[11]. Additionally, the EEA agreement with Armenia created a de facto trade agreement with Nagorno Karabakh because of Armenian occupation of the surrounding areas. This heightened the sentiments of Azerbaijani isolation and increased suspicion that the Minsk Group members were cementing, now through economic agreements, the status quo against Azerbaijan[12].

Turkey and Increasing Military Power

Azerbaijan’s sense of isolation forced it to look beyond the Minsk Group to avoid entrenching the status quo and advance a resolution in its favor on the Nagorno Karabakh issue. Azerbaijan found support and weapons for a military buildup from Turkey, who has been pushing, often through political-military means, for more influence in its immediate region[13][14]. Azerbaijan’s military buildup hastened after successful attack along the southern Line of Contact (LOC) in 2016, altering the long-held perception of Armenia as the stronger military power[15].

Impetus for Renewed Violence in 2020

Accounting for a confluence of factors, the renewed violence in September was push mainly by: 1.) long-running and increasing sentiments of isolation and distrust from the Azerbaijani’s for the status quo and the Minsk peace process and 2.) the Azerbaijani’s increased military capability and confidence in the military option following their military build-up with support from Turkey.

Current Situation

            In November, Armenia was forced to sign a Russian brokered peace agreement after the swift military success of Azerbaijan[16]. Azerbaijan’s success stemmed from a perfect storm of military confidence, Turkish military support and technical assistance, and Israeli drone technology[17]. Also contributing to Azerbaijan’s dominance was Russia’s unwillingness to militarily support Azerbaijan under a mutual defense agreement[18]. This was blow to Armenia’s military capability and territorial claims to areas surrounding Nagorno Karabakh.

The agreement signed on November 10 is enforced by armed Russian peacekeepers[19]. The peacekeepers successfully facilitated long delayed territory exchanged from Armenia to Azerbaijan and are securing peaceful access to Nagorno Karabakh for both sides[20]. The agreement also calls on the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to help facilitate IDP relocation. Despite immediate surface level success, the agreement does not address the underlying causes of the dispute and is thus insufficient to solve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict long-term. The agreement delays negotiations on the final status of Nagorno Karabakh and does not take any measures for the political, social, and economic integration of Azerbaijani and Armenian communities that would counter the process of ethnic isolation, which is the undercurrent of antagonism — the same strategy that undermined the long-term viability of the Minks process.

 Additionally, Russia’s prolonged military presence under the agreement serves the current strategic interest of Russian expansion into former Soviet states and not necessarily a sustainable peace framework[21]. Further, while Russia and Turkey reached an agreement to share monitoring responsibilities and operate the “peacemaking center,” the process does not adequately account for Turkish concerns, as they are not officially involved in the political peace process[22]. Ankara’s long political history in the Southern Caucuses, public rhetoric disparaging the Minsk Group process, and military support for Azerbaijan indicates Turkey’s interest in the situation is not fleeting, and that their position in the peace process needs to be legitimately considered[23].

Strategy for Lasting Peace in Nagorno Karabakh

            Two core issues must be addressed to generate lasting peace in Nagorno Karabakh: 1.) a final political status for Nagorno Karabakh and 2.) reversing ethnic isolation. The thematic answer to both of this question is: integration. Attempting to keep peace through isolation of combatants is frivolous in a world of increasing physical connectivity and improved communication[24]. For example, popular “who fired first” video from the LOC deepened animosity and entrenched the idea of the “other” as nothing but an enemy because both groups are so physically separate[25]. Political, social, and economic integration will generate increased personal interaction among Armenians and Azerbaijanis necessary to humanize one another as more than distant enemies. While local ownership will be essential as well, due to the entrenched animosity, designating too much local ownership may reproduce channels of ethnic isolation, as was seen with EU efforts in Kosovo[26]. Thus, the United States must be scrupulous about who is given what authority at the local level. Taking all of the above into account, the United States should adhere to the following proposals when negotiating a political peace agreement:

1.)   Final Political Status of Nagorno Karabakh

The United States must insist that this decision is final. The role of the United States as negotiator is to ensure both sides are reasonably satisfied by the agreement and are willing to abide by the framework through future government administrations. Long-term stability requires that the final political status not isolate Nagorno Karabakh politically, socially, or economically from either Azerbaijan or Armenia regardless of which state will maintain sovereign control of the territory. To facilitate achieving those fundamental aspects of the final political status, the United States may begin with the following proposal:

A.) Return Nagorno Karabakh to an Autonomous, Oblast-like Status, Under the Sovereignty of Azerbaijan.

This will help instill trust among the Azerbaijanis that the international community, and specifically the United States, are unbiased. This recognizes the technically official status of Nagorno Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory — the recognition and reinstatement of which was delayed during the stalemate of the last peace process. Though they will be displeased, due to the military defeat, Armenia and the Nagorno Karabakh government are not in a strong position to protest this point

B.)  Extend the Boundary of Nagorno Karabakh to Include the Lachin Corridor.

Adding the Lachin Corridor to Nagorno Karabakh will be a small offering to balance the difficulty of accepting point one. In practice, this extension will give Nagorno Karabakh a direct border with Armenia — something it has never had before and which could facilitate better movement of humans and goods between the Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia.

C.) Freedom of Movement for All Parties in and out of Nagorno Karabakh.

Currently, the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan is closed[27]. By connecting Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia through the Lachin Corridor, freedom of movement for Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and people of Nagorno Karabakh into and out of the region will also be a first step toward re-opening the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia in full (see 2-B). This point, combined with 1-B, will also act as guarantee of movement in the area in the case that hostilities re-ignite.

D.) Dual Citizenship.

In a similar fashion to the Good Friday Agreement, all persons in Azerbaijan (including the autonomous zone of Nagorno Karabakh) and Armenia and those born in either state in the future should be entitled to both citizenships. The freedom of movement this will allow will create more interpersonal integration to counter ethnic isolation.

2.)   Economic and Social Integration of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno Karabakh

A.) Free Trade Agreement Between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.

A free trade agreement would reverse the feeling of isolation felt by Azerbaijan. Creating everyday business connections between all four states would also help strengthen the overall interpersonal integration to reverse ethnic isolation. This would provide the region greater access to the European Union through Georgia’s Association Agreement and to the Russian led EEA via Armenia. Including Turkey in the agreement would help to address Turkish concerns about remaining relevant in the region; hopefully, it would also help to calm inter-ethnic tensions between Turkey and Armenia. Practically, the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border would be overwhelmingly useful economically and socially to Armenia[28].

B.)  Open Borders Between Armenia and Azerbaijan

This follows on points 1-C and 1-D. With freedom of movement into Nagorno Karabakh as the absolute minimum, the United States should also push for general freedom of movement between Armenia and Azerbaijan— similar again to the Good Friday Agreement. This will assist with the practicality of any free trade agreement.

3.)   Demilitarization of Nagorno Karabakh

A.) Abolish Nagorno Karabakh Defense Forces, Integrate with Azerbaijani Military and Security Structure

In recognition of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno Karabakh, it is necessary to dismantle the region’s defense forces. Soldiers of the Nagorno Karabakh forces should either be integrated into the Azerbaijani military or become a part of the autonomous region’s domestic police force. The latter integration could be conducted through a similar reorientation program that the UN deployed in El Salvador[29] — where a National Public Security Academy retrained military forces for policing efforts.

B.)  Demilitarizing the Public

The public of Nagorno Karabakh is well armed after almost five full years of increased military spending that took up the vast majority of the government’s budget[30]. While recent reports of civilians turning in weapons hope that the future situation will be peaceful, it also worryingly suggests there are large number of civilians who remain armed[31]. A weapons collection system should be integrated into the current ceasefire monitoring agreement. Tying the weapons collection program to future development assistance (point 6) should be considered. While offering some form of preferential treatment to those with weapons may annoy some residents who were not militarized, it is important that those with weapons are given a non-violent way to advance their livelihood — in this case through international development assistance — lest they return to violence.

4.)   Integration of IDPs

A.) Grant IDPs Full Rights

IDPs from Nagorno Karabakh and surrounding regions in Azerbaijan were given special educational and hiring preferences over the past 25 years, however they were not afforded full political rights in their new regions[32]. This perpetuated a narrative that their full lives could never continue unless they returned to Nagorno Karabakh. IDPs make up at least 10% of the Azerbaijani population[33], creating a large undercurrent in society pushing for a full Azerbaijani reclamation of Nagorno Karabakh and the surrounding area. It is unlikely that every IDP can be reinstated even with OHCHR assistance. Providing full political rights to IDPs will not prevent them from ultimately returning if they wish, but it gives them a practical way to continue their lives where they presently reside without feeling as if they are missing some rights which can only be attained somewhere else. With the freedom of movement clauses (1-C and 2-B), hopefully this will be acceptable by the IDP communities as the process of reorganizing land rights is not likely solvable.

5.)   Military Co-operation

A.) Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan Cooperation on All Ceasefire Missions

The United States should push to ensure that all ceasefire monitoring missions are conducted jointly by the four above parties. This will help create interpersonal links among Azerbaijanis and Armenians, and it will create links between Armenians and Turks. Both connections are necessary for the overall integration mechanism of open borders and trade agreements to be successful. Including additional actors to the monitoring process will also reduce Russia’s outright power over the process and help to prevent the Russians from entrenching themselves in the area with more-permanent military structures.

6.)   Economic Development

A.) Economic Assistance and Restructuring to Nagorno Karabakh

In addition to the development that will hopefully be created through increased trade links and liberalized borders, Nagorno Karabakh requires direct development assistance. Prior to this year’s violence and destruction, Nagorno Karabakh had a fast-growing, oil-export focused economy[34]. Since the economy’s total size is miniscule at about $700 million in GDP[35], it would take minimal resources from the United States to help assist with the economic redevelopment. Major pipelines were not damaged, and rebuilding would likely focus on basic infrastructure of roads and utilities for local use. In lieu of monetary support, the United States could provide technical assistance on diversifying the economy away from oil to ensure long-term stability.

The Role of the United States

In the last decade, the international community took a fragmented approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding: choosing military involvement (Libya and Syria), multilateralism of the UN (UNMHA and MINUSMA), and regional approaches to facilitate peace (G-5 Sahel and ANISOM). With a set of mixed results, it is unclear which (if any) of these past options the international community will continue with going forward. With strong political action in Nagorno Karabakh, the United States can set the tone for peacemaking in the short and medium term. In addition to setting the tone for multilateral peace intervention, this is an opportunity for the United States to rework its image on the international stage. Engaging the Nagorno Karabakh situation as a political peace negotiator, without military involvement, the United States can transition from an image of world policeman to peace architect. Though Nagorno Karabakh may not be one of the “forever wars” high on the priority list to end[36], this will be the Biden Administration’s first chance to create a roadmap for ending other “forever” conflicts elsewhere. In addition to the opportunity the Nagorno Karabakh situation presents for United States’ foreign policy in the peacebuilding arena, the Nagorno Karabakh situation practically requires assistance from an actor interested in the long-term peace and stability of all parties. Currently, all main channels to peace contain serious bias: the current peace process led by the Russians seems to serve Russian interests and does not address the underlying ethnic isolation driving the conflict, there are genuine accusation of French bias in the Minsk Group against Azerbaijan, and Turkey is a public political and military supporter of Azerbaijan. The situation requires an actor with no strategic stake in the area to advocate for the resolution of this foundational problem. The United States can take on this challenge and the following proposals outline potential strategies a new form of United States’ involvement in the Nagorno Karabakh peace process.

Minsk Group or the United Nations: Least Viable

The Minsk Group process does still exist but will likely not produce a satisfactory result. As outlined earlier, the status quo the Minsk Group created and perpetuated the feeling of isolation felt by Azerbaijan, which contributed to the outbreak of violence this year. Additionally, the continued, direct tension between Azerbaijan and France makes France’s impartiality as a co-chair impossible. Finally, with the legitimization of Turkey’s involvement in the peace process as peacekeepers, the United States needs to find a method of engagement that adequately involves Turkey — which the Minsk Group, by Turkey’s own words, does not[37].

To offer greater international legitimacy to the peace process one might consider turning to the United Nations. However, attempting to create a UN Peace Operation or Peacekeeping mission would open up the process to the politics of the Security Council. With France’s veto on the Council, it would be difficult to create a mandate that would be unbiased. Instead of full UN involvement, the United States should only call on the United Nations for specific situations where they may be of assistance. In the same way the current ceasefire calls on the OHCHR to assist with IDPs, the United States might call on the UNDP to help with economic reconstruction.

Solo Actor, New Coalition: Most Viable

The most viable path for the United States to effectively build peace in Nagorno Karabakh is to engage as an independent actor, engaging directly with the Russians, Turks, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and people of Nagorno Karabakh to form a new coalition. Where the Russians and Turks have secured a physical peace, the United States can fill the void of the political peace arbiter. This does not mean that Russian and Turkish concerns will not need to be compromised with, but the United States would be the most neutral actor of the three, especially with the clean slate of the new administration.

NATO: Best Case Scenario

In this situation, the United States will propose a Turkish led NATO peacemaking mission in Nagorno Karabakh (subject to Azerbaijani and Armenian approval). This will greatly appease Turkey — elevating their status within NATO and the Nagorno Karabakh dynamic. This would also achieve the Biden Administration goal to “restore and reimagine partnerships”[38]. Here, NATO is reimagined as a peacebuilding force that can go beyond only military action. Additionally, making NATO a priority so early on in the new administration will publicly restore the United States commitment to tNATO. The outgoing DSG of NATO noted that the organizations main focus remains strengthening basic cooperation and integration[39]. A targeted peacebuilding mission could be a first step toward strengthening those fundamentals under United States leadership.

Further, engaging NATO makes the operation multilateral and less harsh than a solo venture by the United States. Though NATO includes France, the French do not wield the same power as they would in the Minsk Group or the United Nations. This would hopefully make the NATO option palatable to Azerbaijan. NATO could also be welcomed by Azerbaijan and Armenia who do not necessarily trust Russia outright[40]. Russia’s established presence in the peace process is the biggest obstacle to NATO’s involvement. A NATO-Russia peacebuilding partnership would be a massive diplomatic step forward for US-Russian and European-Russian relations — this is highly unlikely. For that reason, the NATO strategy is less than likely to succeed. However, because of the range of potential benefits to the direct conflict and United States foreign policy goals, the NATO option should be considered.

Conclusion

            The current peace process in Nagorno Karabakh does not address the trend of ethnic isolationism that originally formed the conflict. Avoiding this issue and delaying the final political status of the Nagorno Karabakh territory risks recreating a stalled peace process that led to the renewed violence of this year. The United States is well positioned to intervene through the creation of a new multilateral coalition with Turkey and Russia to broker a long-term peace agreement. This agreement must be built on the principle of social and economic integration of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno Karabakh. In addition to the good United States diplomacy could bring to the people of the Southern Caucuses, this would also be a strategically useful move to positively rebrand the United States’ image internationally. Nagorno Karabakh also presents an opportunity for the United States to strengthen its relationship with its NATO allies, especially Turkey.

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Visoka, Gezim and Oliver Richmond “After Liberal Peace; From Failed Statebuilding to Emancipatory Peace in Kosovo” in International Studies Perspectives Vol. 18 (2017) pp. 110 -129

Yackley, Ayla Jean “How Turkey Militarized Its Foreign Policy” in Politico (15 OCT 2020) https://www.politico.eu/article/how-turkey-militarized-foreign-policy-azerbaijan-diplomacy/ (Accessed 30 NOV 2020)

[1] Remler, Philip Chained to the Caucuses: Peacemaking in Karabakh 1987 – 2012 via International Peace Institute (2016) https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/1605-Chained-to-the-Caucasus.pdf     Accessed 30 NOV 2020) pg. 13-4

[2] Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) “Global Conflict Tracker, Nagorno Karabakh” (25 NOV 2020) https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict (Accessed 29 NOV 2020) and Remler (2016) pg. 8

[3] (ibid)

[4] (ibid and CFR, 2016)

[5] (CFR, 2016)

[6] (ibid)

[7] Efron, Sonni “Armenia, Azerbaijan, Agree to Cease-Fire: Caucusus: Moscow Borkers Truce in Former Soviet Union’s Longest-Running Conflict. But Fighting Continues” in Los Angeles Times (17 MAY 1994) https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-05-17-mn-58811-story.html (Accessed 29 NOV 2020)

[8] ibid

[9] Ibid and International Crisis Group (ICG, 2017) “Nagorno-Karabakh’s Gathering War Clouds” in Europe Report No. 244 (1 June 2017) https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/244-nagorno-karabakhs-gathering-war-clouds.pdf (Accessed 28 Nov 2020)

[10] Kim, Lucian “Nagorno Karabakh: US-Brokered Ceasefire Falters Soon After It Starts” in NPR (26 OCT 2020) https://www.npr.org/2020/10/26/927798449/nagorno-karabakh-u-s-brokered-cease-fire-falters-soon-after-it-starts (Accessed 23 NOV 2020)

[11] Melvin, Neil and Guilia Prelz Oltramonti “Managing Conflict and Integration in the South Caucasus: A Challenge for the European Union” in SIPRI (2015) https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRI_CASCADE_Policy_Brief_November-2015.pdf (Accessed 28 NOV 2020)

[12] ibid

[13] Yackley, Ayla Jean “How Turkey Militarized Its Foreign Policy” in Politico (15 OCT 2020) https://www.politico.eu/article/how-turkey-militarized-foreign-policy-azerbaijan-diplomacy/ (Accessed 30 NOV 2020)

[14] Cavanaugh, Carey “Nagorno Karabakh Conflict is Heading to the Point of No Return” Financial Times (27 OCT 20) and Remler, 2016; pg. 8-11

[15] ICG (2017) pp. 7-10

[16] Kramer, Andrew E. “Facing Military Debacle, Armenia Accepts a Deal in Nagorno-Karabakh War” in The New York Times (9 NOV 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/world/middleeast/armenia-settlement-nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan.html (Accessed 24 NOV 2020)

[17] Gressel, Gustav “Military lessons From Nagorno Karabakh: Reason for Europe to Worry” (24 Nov 2020) from European Council on Foreign Relations https://ecfr.eu/article/military-lessons-from-nagorno-karabakh-reason-for-europe-to-worry/ (Accessed 24 Nov 2020) and Dixon, Robyn “Azerbaijan’s Drones Owned the Battlefield in Nagorno Karabakh — and Showed the Future of Warfare” in The Washington Post (11 NOV 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nagorno-karabkah-drones-azerbaijan-aremenia/2020/11/11/441bcbd2-193d-11eb-8bda-814ca56e138b_story.html (Accessed 24 NOV 2020)

[18] ICG “The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer” (26 OCT 20) https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer (Accessed 30 NOV 2020) and Foy, Henry and Max Seddon “Armenia Calls for Russian Help as Fight with Azerbaijan Intensifies” in Financial Times (1 NOV 2020) https://www.ft.com/content/9ca3163a-d267-4ac2-bfc3-77f86995dc75 (Accessed 1 NOV 2020)

[19] All references to the current ceasefire agreement refer to the text published directly by the Kremlin:

Russia, President of “Statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, and the President of the Russian Federation” (10 NOV 2020) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384

[20] RFE/RL “Russian Peacekeepers Guard Key Nagorno Karabakh Road” (19 NOV 2020) https://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-azerbaijan-russia-peacekeepers/30959038.html (Accessed 20 NOV 2020) [20] US Department of State (11 JUL 2001); RFE/RL (25 NOV 2020); and France 24 “Azerbaijani Forces Enter Lachin, Last District Handed Over By Armenia” (1 DEC 2020) https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20201201-azerbaijani-forces-enter-lachin-last-district-handed-over-by-armenia (Accessed 1 DEC 2020)

[21] ICG “Georgia and Russia: Why and How to Save Normalization” (27 OCT 2020) https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b90-georgia-russia-normalisation_0.pdf (Accessed 30 NOV 2020) pp. 7-9); Szálkai, Kinga “Russia’s Recent Military Build-up in Central Asia” from CSIS (25 SEP 2020) https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/russias-recent-military-buildup-central-asia (30 NOV 2020); and Abrahamyan, Eduard and Gevorg Melikyan “Moscow Worreis Armenia Velvet Revolution Could Lessen Its Leverage Over Yerevan” in Eurasia Daily Monitor (3 MAY 2018) https://jamestown.org/program/armenias-velvet-revolution-threatens-moscows-continued-leverage-over-country/ (Accessed 30 NOV 2020)

[22] Aljazeera “Turkey Seeks Approval to Deploy Peacekeepers to Azerbaijan” (16 NOV 2020) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/16/turkey-seeks-approval-to-deploy-peacekeepers-in-azerbaijan (Accessed 30 NOV 2020)

[23] Bagirova Nailia and Nvard Hovhannisyan “Turkey Rebuffs Russia, France and U.S. Over Nagorno Karabakh Ceasefire Moves” (1 OCT 2020) https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-armenia-azerbaijan/turkey-rebuffs-russia-france-and-u-s-over-nagorno-karabakh-ceasefire-moves-idUKKBN26M5G2 (Accessed 1 OCT 2020) and Remler, 2016; pp. 8-11

[24] Galtung, Johan “On the Future of the International System” in Journal of Peace Research Vol. 1 No. 4 (1967) pp. 305-333

[25] ICG (2017) pg. 4

[26] Visoka, Gezim and Oliver Richmond “After Liberal Peace; From Failed Statebuilding to Emancipatory Peace in Kosovo” in International Studies Perspectives Vol. 18 (2017) pp. 110 -129

[27] The Armenian border is only open to Georgia and Iran. Iran is not likely to be involved in the situation because it uses Armenia as a staging area to bypass international sanction, and the Iranian government does not want to too publicly support Azerbaijan for fear of stoking Azerbaijani nationalism in their country - (Nadimi, Farzin “Flare-Up in Nagorno Karabakh: The Iranian Dimension” from The Washington Institute (6 OCT 2020) https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/flare-up-in-nagorno-karabakh-the-iranian-dimension (Accessed 26 NOV 2020) )

[28] Kirisçi, Kemal and Behlül Özkan “After Russia’s Nagorno Karabakh Ceasefire, Could Turkey Step Up for Lasting Peace” from Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/18/after-russias-nagorno-karabakh-ceasefire-could-turkey-step-up-next-for-a-lasting-peace/ (Accessed 30 NOV 2020) and European Union The Closed Armenian Turkey Border (2007) http://www.tepsa.eu/download/studies_for_the_european_parliament/briefings-on-turkey/armenia_turkey_border.pdf

[29] United Nations The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, Third Edition (New York, 1996) p. 431

[30] ICG (2017) pp. 14-18

[31] RFE/RL (19 NOV 2020)

[32] ICG (2017) pp. 7-10

[33] UNHCR Azerbaijan: Analysis of Gaps in Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (2009) https://www.unhcr.org/4bd7edbd9.pdf (Accessed 19 NOV 2020)

[34] DW “Nagorno Karabakh’s Record Growth Is in Ruins Amid Conflict and Pandemic” (12 OCT 2020) https://www.dw.com/en/nagorno-karabakhs-record-growth-in-ruins-amid-conflict-and-pandemic/a-55221921 (Accessed 1 DEC 2020)

[35] Ibid

[36] Biden for President “The Power of America’s Example” https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/# (Accessed 1 DEC 2020)

[37] Bagirova (1 OCT 2020)

[38] Biden for President

[39] Oliker, Olga and Hugh Pope “The Future of NATO” from War and Peace (Podcast) 24 NOV 2020 https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/war-peace (Accessed 28 NOV 2020)

[40] ICG (2017) pp. 15-16.